

**SIPO (Seminario de Investigadores Postdoctorales)**

**Speaker:** Svenja Griesbach (CMM)

**Title:** Deterministic Impartial Selection with Weights.

**Abstract:**

In the impartial selection problem, a subset of agents up to a fixed size  $k$  among a group of  $n$  is to be chosen based on votes cast by the agents themselves. A selection mechanism is impartial if no agent can influence its own chance of being selected by changing its vote. It is  $\alpha$ -optimal if, for every instance, the ratio between the votes received by the selected subset is at least a fraction of  $\alpha$  of the votes received by the subset of size  $k$  with the highest number of votes.

We study deterministic impartial mechanisms in a more general setting with arbitrarily weighted votes and provide the first approximation guarantee, roughly  $1/\lceil 2n/k \rceil$ . When the number of agents to select is large enough compared to the total number of agents, this yields an improvement on the previously best known approximation ratio of  $1/k$  for the unweighted setting. We further show that our mechanism can be adapted to the impartial assignment problem, in which multiple sets of up to  $k$  agents are to be selected, with a loss in the approximation ratio of  $1/2$ .

**Date and Time:** 5th May, Monday at 2.30 PM

**Venue:** John Von Neumann Seminar Room, CMM, Beauchef 851, North Tower, 7th Floor

