Noticias en español
Rawlsian Assignments.
Abstract: We study the assignment of indivisible objects to individuals when transfers are not allowed. Previous literature has mainly focused on efficiency (from ex-ante and ex-post perspectives), and individually fair assignments. Consequently, egalitarian concerns have been overlooked. We are inspired by the assignment of apartments in housing cooperatives where families regard the egalitarianism of the assignments as a first-order requirement. In particular, they want to avoid assignments where some families get their most preferred apartment, while others get options ranked very low in...
Read MoreToward Elimination of Infectious Diseases with Mobile Screening Teams: HAT in the DRC.
Abstract: In pursuit of Sustainable Development Goal 3 “Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages,” considerable global effort is directed toward elimination of infectious diseases in general and Neglected Tropical Diseases in particular. For various such diseases, the deployment of mobile screening teams forms an important instrument to reduce prevalence toward elimination targets. There is considerable variety in planning methods for the deployment of these mobile teams in practice, but little understanding of their effectiveness. Moreover, there appears to be little...
Read MoreRecursive local amoeba construction.
Abstract: Amoeba graphs were born as examples of balanceable graphs, which are graphs that appear in any 2-edge coloring of the edges of a large enough $K_n$ with a sufficient amount of red and blue edges. As they were studied further, interesting aspects were found. An edge replacement $e\to e$ in a labeled graph G means to take an edge e in E(G) and replace it with e’ \in E(\overline{G})\cup \{e\}$. If $G-e+e’$ is isomorphic to $G$ then we say $e\to e’$ is a \emph{feasible edge replacement}. Every edge replacement yields a set of permutations of the labels in $G$. The set...
Read MoreBayesian Persuasion With Costly Information Acquisition.
Abstract: We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver can gather independent information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender provides information that prevents the receiver from gathering independent information in equilibrium. When the receiver faces a lower cost of information, her `threat’ of gathering independent information increases, thus decreasing the sender’s power to persuade. A lower cost of information can also hurt the receiver because the sender may provide strictly less information in equilibrium....
Read MoreThe kidney exchange problem: length-constrained cycles and chains optimization on compatibility graphs.
Abstract: The kidney exchange problem is a combinatorial optimization problem that arises naturally when implementing centralized kidney exchange programs. Given a directed weighted graph (called the compatibility graph), we aim to find a collection of simple and vertex-disjoint cycles maximizing the total weight of their participating arcs. Because of logistical considerations, a bound k is placed on the length of each possible cycle. We will briefly explain how the problem is polynomially solvable in the cases k = 2 and unbounded k, and why it turns NP-complete for k >= 3. MIP...
Read MoreSolidarity Cover Problem.
Abstract: This work started with a real-world problem where the task was to partition a set of locations into disjoint subsets such that each subset is spread in a way that it covers the whole set with a certain radius. This made us formalizing the following problem which we call Solidarty Cover Problem. Given a finite set S, a metric d, and a radius r, and a number of partitions m. We define a subset C of S to be an r-cover if B(C,r)=S. The Solidarity Cover Problem is the problem of determining whether there exist m disjoint r-covers. We consider the optimization problems of maximizing the...
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