In this apportionment lottery, the House always wins.

Abstract Apportionment is the problem of distributing h indivisible seats across states in proportion to the states’ populations. In the context of the US House of Representatives, this problem has a rich history and is a prime example of interactions between mathematical analysis and political practice. Grimmett suggested to apportion seats in a randomized way such that each state receives exactly their proportional share qᵢ of seats in expectation (ex ante proportionality) and receives either qᵢ or qᵢ many seats ex post (quota). However, there is a vast space of randomized apportionment methods satisfying these two axioms, and so we additionally consider prominent axioms from the apportionment literature. Our main result is a randomized method satisfying quota, ex ante proportionality and house monotonicity — a property that prevents paradoxes when the number of seats changes and which we require to hold ex post. This result is based on a generalization of dependent rounding on bipartite graphs, which we call cumulative rounding and which might be of independent interest, as we demonstrate via applications beyond apportionment.

Date: Jun 22, 2023 at 15:00:00 h
Venue: Sala de Seminarios del CMM John Von Neumann piso 7, Torre Norte, Beauchef 851.
Speaker: Paul Gölz
Affiliation: Harvard U.
Coordinator: José Verschae
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Posted on Jun 20, 2023 in ACGO, Seminars